Bangladesh is confronting two safety questions virtually on the similar time. One considerations the potential of becoming a member of a brand new collective defence association involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan. The opposite considerations a significant modernisation of the Bangladesh Air Power, centred on the potential acquisition of Chinese J-10CE fighter aircraft.
Taken individually, every will be defended on cheap grounds. Bangladesh wants stronger defence capabilities. It additionally has reputable causes to deepen safety cooperation with international locations past its rapid neighbourhood. However when these developments are thought of collectively, a tougher query seems.
The actual difficulty isn’t merely whether or not Bangladesh can purchase a selected fighter plane or be a part of a selected defence association. It’s whether or not a sequence of apparently rational safety selections may, over time, cut back the very strategic freedom that Bangladesh desires these selections to guard.
For a small state, navy functionality and strategic autonomy are associated, however they aren’t the identical factor. Extra weapons don’t routinely produce extra autonomy. Extra safety companions don’t routinely produce extra safety. A lot depends upon the obligations, dependencies and political alerts that include them. That’s the rising dilemma for Bangladesh.
Safety cooperation isn’t the identical as a safety dedication
There’s, first, a factual distinction that shouldn’t be missed. Bangladesh has not joined the Mecca Joint Defence Settlement. International Minister Khalilur Rahman instructed parliament on August 27 that Bangladesh would take into account membership positively if invited, whereas additionally saying that the query had not formally arisen as a result of Dhaka had not acquired such a proposal from the present members.
That distinction issues as a result of the Mecca settlement isn’t merely one other framework for navy coaching, defence dialogue or arms cooperation. The settlement, signed on August 7 by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, states that an armed assault towards one member shall be handled as an assault towards all three.
This modifications the character of the calculation. Bangladesh already conducts defence cooperation with many international locations. Such relationships can develop its choices. A collective-defence dedication does one thing completely different: it could actually limit the liberty to resolve, case by case, whether or not one other state’s battle can also be Bangladesh’s battle.
For this reason a safety assure isn’t fully free. In return for the chance that others could assist defend you, you settle for the chance that you’ll have to assist them.
The actual difficulty isn’t merely whether or not Bangladesh can purchase a selected fighter plane or be a part of a selected defence association. It’s whether or not a sequence of apparently rational safety selections may, over time, cut back the very strategic freedom that Bangladesh desires these selections to guard.
However there may be an extra query price asking. What occurs when a potential collective-defence dedication develops similtaneously Bangladesh is changing into extra deeply tied to a selected exterior supply for high-end navy functionality? That’s the place the J-10CE turns into strategically vital.
Shopping for a fighter plane additionally means shopping for a relationship
The case for modernising the Bangladesh Air Power isn’t obscure. An air power can not stay credible indefinitely with ageing platforms whereas navy know-how round it advances.
The federal government says it’s transferring ahead with the procurement of J-10CE multirole fighter plane, assault helicopters and UAV methods. A committee has already negotiated parts of the proposed buy and ready a draft settlement. There are additionally comprehensible operational causes for contemplating the Chinese language plane. Adviser Zahed Ur Rahman has pointed to its latest fight efficiency and its decrease value in contrast with some European options.
It will subsequently be too simplistic to argue that purchasing Chinese language fighters is itself a lack of strategic autonomy. A rustic able to selecting its personal weapons provider is exercising sovereignty, not surrendering it. The issue lies elsewhere.
A contemporary fighter plane isn’t a one-time buy. It creates a relationship which will final for many years. The client wants coaching, spare elements, weapons, upkeep, software program assist, upgrades, technical experience and logistical infrastructure. The plane could also be delivered inside a number of years, however the dependence created by working it could actually proceed for much longer.
The strategic query is subsequently not merely: is the J-10CE a succesful plane? It’s: what diploma of long-term dependence accompanies that functionality?
China is already Bangladesh’s principal provider of main navy {hardware}. Reuters reviews that, over the previous twenty years, Beijing has equipped Bangladesh with fight plane, naval vessels, tanks, missiles and different tools.
There’s nothing inherently harmful about having a significant defence provider. Virtually each navy depends upon international know-how to some extent. The chance seems when an excessive amount of of a rustic’s crucial functionality turns into tied to 1 supply. For a small state, provider diversification is subsequently not merely a business matter. It’s a type of strategic insurance coverage.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signal a joint protection settlement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, August 7, 2026. Picture: Reuters
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Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signal a joint protection settlement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, August 7, 2026. Picture: Reuters
Intentions are ours; perceptions belong to others
There’s one other issue that Bangladesh can not management fully. Dhaka could view the J-10CE purely as an instrument of defence modernisation. Beijing could view the sale primarily as defence cooperation. However neighbouring international locations are free to interpret it in another way.
India has already stated that it’s intently following Bangladesh’s increasing engagement with China, together with discussions regarding the potential J-10CE acquisition, and that it might take related developments under consideration in its broader strategy in direction of Bangladesh. That doesn’t imply Bangladesh ought to enable India to veto its defence selections. A sovereign state should retain the proper to amass the capabilities it considers needed.
However sovereignty doesn’t take away penalties. This is without doubt one of the hardest realities going through small states: they make their very own selections, however they can’t decide how bigger neighbours interpret these selections.
A navy step meant to make one nation safer could make one other nation really feel much less safe. The second nation then responds, producing larger suspicion on each side. Worldwide relations students name this a safety dilemma, however its logic is kind of easy: defensive intentions don’t assure defensive interpretations.
Now place the 2 developments collectively. China is already Bangladesh’s most vital defence provider. The proposed J-10CE buy may deepen that navy relationship significantly. In the meantime, Bangladesh is publicly expressing a optimistic angle in direction of a collective-defence association wherein Pakistan—India’s principal navy rival—is a founding member.
Neither growth by itself implies that Bangladesh is aligning towards India. However states reply not solely to particular person selections; in addition they reply to patterns. If Dhaka concurrently deepens its high-end navy dependence on China and considers coming into a defence construction that features Pakistan, New Delhi could interpret the mix in another way from the way in which Bangladesh intends it. And that is exactly the place larger navy functionality can paradoxically cut back diplomatic room.
Bangladesh may acquire higher plane whereas going through a extra suspicious India. It may acquire further defence companions whereas creating new expectations amongst these companions. It may purchase stronger deterrence whereas making its safety relationships more durable to separate from wider geopolitical rivalries. The chance isn’t that Bangladesh immediately turns into a part of one geopolitical camp. The extra lifelike hazard is a gradual narrowing of choices.
A navy step meant to make one nation safer could make one other nation really feel much less safe. The second nation then responds, producing larger suspicion on each side. Worldwide relations students name this a safety dilemma, however its logic is kind of easy: defensive intentions don’t assure defensive interpretations.
Strategic autonomy is the flexibility to say each sure and no
Strategic autonomy is typically misunderstood as staying equally distant from everybody. Scholarly, that’s neither lifelike nor significantly helpful.
Bangladesh ought to cooperate with China the place cooperation serves its pursuits. It ought to preserve a working relationship with India as a result of geography makes that unavoidable. It ought to deepen relations with Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Japan, america, Europe and others the place doing so produces financial or strategic advantages.
Autonomy doesn’t imply avoiding partnerships. It means retaining sufficient decisions in order that no single partnership determines the nation’s behaviour in direction of all of the others.
That’s the reason the current debate ought to transfer past the outdated query of whether or not Bangladesh is “pro-China”, “pro-India” or “pro-Western”. These labels are analytically weak as a result of Bangladesh can cooperate with completely different powers in numerous fields.
The higher query is whether or not Bangladesh is constructing a sufficiently diversified set of relationships to forestall anybody exterior actor—or mixture of actors—from buying disproportionate affect over its decisions.
That intuition is appropriate. If Bangladesh buys the J-10CE, the lesson shouldn’t be to cease shopping for Chinese language weapons. It ought to be to make sure that the nation’s complete defence system doesn’t grow to be unnecessarily concentrated round one provider. Equally, Bangladesh can cooperate intently with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan with out essentially accepting an computerized dedication to their future conflicts. Partnership and alignment will not be the identical factor. Good small-state technique depends upon preserving that distinction.
The financial query can’t be separated from the strategic one
Navy procurement additionally has a possibility value. Bangladesh’s proposed defence allocation for FY2026-27 is round Tk 42,497 crore. A fighter programme price greater than $2 billion would subsequently symbolize a significant long-term nationwide funding. That doesn’t routinely make it extreme. Nationwide defence prices cash, and delaying needed modernisation can itself grow to be costly.
However a small state has much less room than a significant energy for procurement errors. A fighter buy ought to subsequently be judged not by status or by the efficiency of an plane overseas’s conflict, however by Bangladesh’s personal risk atmosphere. What exact mission will the plane carry out? What weapons and surveillance methods will assist it? How a lot will it value to function over its full life? How weak will Bangladesh be to disruptions in spare elements and upgrades? And does the acquisition match inside a broader defence doctrine? These questions matter greater than whether or not one plane defeated one other plane some other place.
Encouragingly, the federal government has additionally mentioned constructing a home defence industrial base particularly to cut back dependence on international suppliers. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has spoken of a “Made in Bangladesh” defence initiative and a potential defence industrial zone aimed toward larger long-term self-reliance.
That’s strategically extra vital than it might first seem. A rustic that may preserve, restore, manufacture and finally develop extra of its personal navy methods has larger freedom than one which merely imports more and more superior platforms.
A Chinese language Chengdu J-10 fighter plane performs a flight throughout the Aviadarts competitors, as a part of the Worldwide Military Video games 2021, on the Dubrovichi vary outdoors Ryazan, Russia August 27, 2021. Picture: REUTERS
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A Chinese language Chengdu J-10 fighter plane performs a flight throughout the Aviadarts competitors, as a part of the Worldwide Military Video games 2021, on the Dubrovichi vary outdoors Ryazan, Russia August 27, 2021. Picture: REUTERS
Bangladesh wants an built-in safety doctrine
The best weak spot within the current debate is that particular person selections are too simply mentioned in isolation. The Mecca Pact is handled as a foreign-policy difficulty. The J-10CE is handled as a procurement difficulty. Relations with India are handled as a bilateral difficulty. Relations with China are mentioned individually once more.
However international governments is not going to view them individually. Bangladesh subsequently wants to guage them collectively. Earlier than accepting a collective-defence dedication, Dhaka ought to ask what particular risk that dedication is meant to handle and below what circumstances Bangladesh might be required to behave. Earlier than finalising a significant weapons buy, it ought to study not solely the acquisition value and fight efficiency but additionally the total chain of technological and logistical dependence.
And earlier than making both determination, policymakers ought to take into account how the mix will have an effect on Bangladesh’s relationships with India, China, america, the Gulf states and different companions.
None of this requires Bangladesh to hunt one other nation’s permission. It requires one thing extra invaluable: strategic foresight. For many years, Bangladesh’s best geopolitical benefit has not been navy power. It has been its capacity to work with international locations that compete with each other. China is usually a defence associate, India an indispensable neighbour, america an vital financial and safety associate, Japan a significant growth associate, and the Gulf international locations essential financial and labour locations—all on the similar time.
That flexibility is an asset. Bangladesh ought to be cautious to not alternate it too cheaply for safety preparations whose long-term obligations will not be but absolutely understood. The selection earlier than Dhaka is subsequently not between navy weak spot and strategic autonomy. That might be a false alternative. Bangladesh wants stronger defence capabilities. It additionally wants wider safety relationships.
The problem is to construct each with out changing into trapped by both. Extra functionality doesn’t need to imply much less autonomy. However functionality with out diversification, safety partnerships with out clear limits, and procurement and not using a bigger strategic doctrine can produce precisely that outcome.
For a small state, the strongest defence isn’t merely the flexibility to amass extra highly effective weapons or extra highly effective mates. It’s the capacity to strengthen itself whereas preserving the liberty to resolve—every time, and by itself phrases—when to cooperate, when to stay outdoors a battle, and when to say no. That’s the strategic autonomy Bangladesh ought to defend.
Mohd Amdadul Haque is a doctoral candidate within the Division of Worldwide Politics at Shandong College and an Assistant Professor within the Division of Political Science at Gopalganj Science and Expertise College. His work focuses on geopolitics, maritime safety, great-power rivalry, and Bangladesh’s international coverage. He will be reached at [email protected].
