The six decrees named Ali Abdollahi chief of workers of the armed forces, with Kioumars Heydari as his deputy; Ahmad Vahidi commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards, with Mostafa Izadi as his deputy; Ali Azmaei commander of the Guards’ navy; and Hossein Taeb, the scary former intelligence chief of the Guards, head of the Basij.
Individually, Mohsen Rezaei, the previous Guards commander named Khamenei’s army adviser in March, grew to become secretary of the Supreme Nationwide Safety Council and the chief’s consultant on the physique.
The appointments put veterans of the Guards, intelligence providers and Iran-Iraq battle era throughout the higher reaches of the safety institution. However quite than marking a wholesale altering of the guard, they draw closely on figures who constructed their careers below Ali Khamenei — leaving open whether or not the brand new supreme chief is imposing his authority on the system or assembling an skilled safety bloc whose assist he must train it.
Khamenei’s directives counsel the adjustments are usually not merely about personnel. In his appointment decree for Vahidi, he known as for strengthening the pressure’s capabilities for “most deterrence” and sustaining readiness to hold out “highly effective offensive operations towards the enemy.”
Lawmaker Ebrahim Rezaei described the appointments as “principally a sign of the truth that the Islamic Republic is shifting towards a extra offensive army construction.”
Struggle commanders transfer to the highest
The clearest signal that Khamenei could also be altering how the army is run, quite than merely changing its commanders, lies within the elevation of Abdollahi and Heydari from the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters to the 2 highest positions within the Armed Forces Common Workers.
The Common Workers is Iran’s highest army coordinating physique, whereas Khatam Central Headquarters has a extra operational wartime position, coordinating army exercise throughout totally different branches.
There was no confirmed announcement that the 2 our bodies have formally merged, however pro-establishment commentator Mohammad-Sadegh Alizadeh stated the appointments confirmed a means of centralizing Iran’s army command.
“The merger of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters and the Armed Forces Common Workers means concentrating the nation’s wartime, army and offensive actions,” he wrote on X, including that Abdollahi’s decree explicitly tasked him with finishing the method.
Abdollahi beforehand served as coordination deputy of the Common Workers and deputy commander of Iran’s police. Heydari commanded the common Military Floor Forces for greater than seven years earlier than shifting into Khatam’s command construction in late 2025.
Heydari’s appointment additionally preserves a senior common Military presence close to the highest of a management closely populated by Revolutionary Guards veterans, suggesting that better centralization doesn’t essentially quantity to easy IRGC domination of the command construction.
Taeb’s return places home safety in focus
If the Abdollahi and Heydari appointments level to tighter wartime command, Taeb’s return to the Basij reveals the domestic-security aspect of Khamenei’s rising construction.
Taeb commanded the Basij in the course of the unrest following Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election and later spent greater than a decade heading the IRGC Intelligence Group earlier than his removing in 2022.
Khamenei’s decree requires strengthening what it describes because the Basij’s “widespread intelligence community,” drawing consideration to the surveillance and internal-security element of Taeb’s mandate.
New York-based journalist and Center East author Séamus Malekafzali stated Taeb’s return was notably important given his intelligence background.
“Taeb spent 13 years after leaving the Basij as the top of IRGC intelligence,” he wrote on X on August 10. Referring to Khamenei’s directive for a “grassroots confrontation with enemy threats,” he added that it “definitely seems like ensuring the January protests by no means occur once more.”
Taeb has additionally lengthy been recognized with Mojtaba Khamenei’s safety community. When he was eliminated as IRGC intelligence chief in 2022, Jason Brodsky, coverage director at United Towards Nuclear Iran, described the transfer as “an earthquake in Iran’s intelligence neighborhood,” noting his shut relationship with each Ali Khamenei and his son.
His return subsequently restores a longtime Khamenei confidant to command of a company embedded throughout universities, workplaces, neighborhoods and state establishments, and which has performed a central position in surveillance, political mobilization and the suppression of protests.
Journalist Morteza Kazemian linked the appointment to worsening financial circumstances and public discontent, arguing that Taeb had turn into one in all Khamenei’s trusted devices of safety and governance and that the Basij below his command was meant to embody the management’s “iron fist.”
Rezaei comeback underscores reliance on previous guard
If Taeb’s return highlights Khamenei’s reliance on trusted safety figures, Rezaei’s comeback makes the generational continuity more durable to overlook.
Rezaei commanded the Revolutionary Guards from 1981 to 1997, together with via many of the Iran-Iraq battle, earlier than shifting into politics and holding a succession of senior state positions.
He later served on the Expediency Council, repeatedly ran for president and have become vp for financial affairs below Ebrahim Raisi. Khamenei appointed him army adviser in March earlier than naming him secretary of the Supreme Nationwide Safety Council and his consultant on the physique lower than 5 months later.
Journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi questioned why Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr had been changed by Rezaei and what substantive change the appointment was meant to deliver.
“What does the appointment of Mohsen Rezaei instead of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as secretary of the Supreme Nationwide Safety Council imply, and what change is it presupposed to deliver to the way in which this place operates?” he wrote on X.
Some Iranian social-media customers responded with mockery, reviving jokes surrounding Rezaei’s repeated presidential campaigns and decades-long circulation via senior state positions.
The criticism mirrored one of many broader themes surrounding the reshuffle: that Khamenei’s first main appointments have elevated not a brand new era of officers, however males who’ve occupied the Islamic Republic’s army and political institution for many years.
Vahidi promotion highlights hardline continuity
Vahidi’s promotion provides one other dimension to that continuity: the elevation of a commander whose document spans Iran’s exterior army operations and home repression.
Vahidi had served as performing Guards commander following Mohammad Pakpour’s demise in the course of the battle with the USA and Israel. Khamenei formally put in him as commander and promoted him to main common.
He beforehand held senior roles within the Quds Pressure and served as protection minister below Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and inside minister below Ebrahim Raisi.
Argentine prosecutors have sought Vahidi in reference to the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish neighborhood heart in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 individuals. Iran denies involvement.
Israel’s international ministry targeted its response to the reshuffle on Vahidi and Rezaei, linking each males to allegations surrounding the AMIA case and accusing Tehran of elevating figures related to assaults overseas.
“The Iranian regime worships terror, rewards its architects and promotes them to the best ranges of energy,” the ministry stated on X.
The USA has additionally sanctioned Vahidi over his position as inside minister in the course of the suppression of protests following Mahsa Amini’s demise in custody in 2022.
However the wartime document of Vahidi, Abdollahi and Taeb additionally complicates the concept their elevation merely represents Khamenei extending his private management over the safety equipment.
President Masoud Pezeshkian accused Vahidi and Abdollahi of taking unilateral army actions that undermined efforts to safe a ceasefire, Iran Worldwide reported in April. The report additionally described a heated confrontation involving Taeb.
All three males now occupy senior positions within the military-security construction below Khamenei, elevating the likelihood that the brand new chief has elevated figures whose institutional energy was already appreciable earlier than he formally appointed them.
Khamenei’s first imprint on safety institution
A number of main worldwide shops interpreted the reshuffle as an early indication of how Khamenei intends to form the safety institution after succeeding his father.
The Wall Avenue Journal portrayed the appointments as Khamenei placing his stamp on the national-security system and signaling a harder strategy towards Washington.
“Iran’s mysterious ruler indicators a tough line on Trump with new management,” the newspaper wrote.
The Monetary Instances targeted on the promotion of loyalists and the likelihood that Rezaei’s return might level towards a more durable line on the USA, whereas Reuters described Rezaei as an in depth ally of Khamenei and highlighted his current opposition to extending a ceasefire and his skepticism towards negotiations with Washington.
These readings emphasize Khamenei’s position in selecting the brand new hierarchy. However the identities of the boys he selected level simply as strongly to continuity with the safety institution inherited from his father.
Iran Worldwide analysts had raised that rigidity even earlier than the most recent decrees.
The deaths of Ali Khamenei and different senior officers created a management hole by which his successor was nonetheless working to consolidate his place, Kazemian stated in Might.
After the appointments have been introduced, journalist Kamyar Behrang argued that the demise of Ali Khamenei, who had served because the system’s last arbiter, had given the Revolutionary Guards better room to form the political order that adopted him.
The appointments can subsequently be learn in each instructions. Khamenei is inserting his personal stamp on the army and safety hierarchy, centralizing command and restoring trusted figures to key posts.
However he’s doing so largely via males shaped below his father’s rule — veteran commanders and intelligence officers whose institutional weight could also be as vital to his authority as their loyalty to him.
The primary map of energy below Mojtaba Khamenei is taking form. What stays unclear is whether or not these males are primarily devices of his management, or the institution on which that management relies upon.
